Whos Head is it Anyway?
DES MOINES COUNTY- Today in the Iowa Court of Appeals, an appellate trial was brought in concerning the disinterment (removal from grave) of the body of Orville Richardson. The plaintiff, Alcor Life Extension Foundation, was seeking an appeal against the defendants, David Richardson and Darlene Broeker, who happen to be the siblings of Orville and also his legal guardians. Alcor requested the disinterment of Orville’s body to fulfill Orville’s previous wishes that David and Darlene clearly failed to meet. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case unanimously for further consideration. This opinion was written by Justice Edward M. Mansfield.
Background
First, let’s start with a little bit of background on the case. The Alcor Life Extension Foundation is a nonprofit scientific organization that is seeking to find answers in the practice of cryonic suspension. The writer of the court opinion, J. Mansfield, stated that, “Alcor defines cryonic suspension as ‘[t]he procedure of placing the bodies/brains of people who have been declared legally dead into storage at temperatures of -100 degrees Celsius or lower, with the hope that future medical development will allow the restoration of life and health.'” Orville, a long time pharmacist, signed an agreement with Alcor stating that when he died, Alcor had the right to use his brain for “neurosuspension”. Yes readers, this would in fact be the process of removing Orville’s head and freezing it for Alcor’s said research purposes. In this agreement, Orville paid a membership fee of $53,500 and made arrangements under the “Last Will and Testament for Human Remains and Authorization of Anatomical Donation”.
Around three years later, Orville was no longer able to live on his own because of his dementia and in result, his sister (Darlene) and brother (David) filed paper work within the court system allowing them to handle the daily life and financials of Orville as co-conservators. Orville had previously told his siblings about his wishes, but as Mansfield addressed, “David and Darlene state that they ‘tried to talk [Orville] out of such a plan and they emphatically told him they would have nothing to do with his plan.'” The conversation was never brought up again, and David and Darlene told the court that they had never seen the agreement made by Orville and Alcor.
On February 19th, 2009, Orville passed away with David and Darlene embalming and burying him three days later. Nearly two months after the burial, David wrote to Alcor asking for a refund of the membership payment made by Orville at the time of the agreement (June 4, 2004). Alcor was unsure why Orville’s wishes were not carried out and demanded Orville’s remains. When David and Darlene refused, Alcor filed a motion with the court that they had control over Orville’s remains under the Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. Briefly put, this act prohibits the cancellation of an anatomical gift by anyone other than the donor–in this case, Orville. Mansfield added that “As a remedy, Alcor asked the district court to order David and Darlene to obtain a permit for the disinterment of Orville’s body. Alcor offered to pay all expenses associated with the disinterment.” David and Darlene defended themselves with the rights of the Final Disposition Act, in which the next of kin has the right to dispose of the body of a loved one. No testimonies were made, and the court sided with the siblings on terms of the Final Disposition Act, the unnecessary disinterment reasons, and the fact that the siblings had no knowledge of Alcor and Orville’s agreement.
The Appeal
Alcor appealed this decision in the appellate court today and the decision was that the case be reconsidered on terms of the Revised Anatomical Gift Act, the Final Disposition Act, and the consent by the courts of disinterment.
Revised Anatomical Gift Act
The first concern was if the Revised Anatomical Gift Act (RUAGA) applies in this situation. Many revisions have been made to this act in the past and the court had to keep in mind the revision date and the date of when Orville signed the agreement. One of the main revisions looked at in this case was the 2006 revision that families could not reverse a donors wishes after death and that family did not have to consent to those wishes. This essentially made the decision the donor higher up than the desire of the family. It was decided by the court that the 2006 revision needed to be looked at more in a later part of the motion.
Alcor was first questioned under RUAGA for being an appropriate person for research. RUAGA states that an anatomical gift must go a hospital, medical schools, organ procurement organization, or another appropriate person for research. The problem here is that Alcor was not considered an organ procurement organization, so the court ran into the problem of defining who exactly “another appropriate person for research” was. Because Alcor qualifies for a tax-exempt, non-profit company and cryopreservation is a form of research, the appellate judges decided that Alcor does in fact “meet the definition of an ‘appropriate person for research.'” Another requirement of RUAGA stated by Mansfield is that donor receives no satisfaction “other than the knowledge that he or she is providing either the ‘gift of life’ to an unknown third party or specimen for medical research.” With the fact that Orville paid Alcor and made an agreement, this requirement got a little iffy. The appellate court concluded however that Orville’s agreement was in fact considered a gift under RUAGA. This was concluded in three instances. First, the agreement between Orville and Alcor clearly states that Orville “had ‘made this donation for the purpose of furthering cryobiological and cryonic research.'” Second, in a section of RUAGA, it addresses that reasonable payment may be accepted for the preservation of body parts. Third, if this transaction was not considered a gift, it would be assumed that Alcor was paying Orville for his services, not the other way around. These conclusions lead into the next problem of the Final Disposition Act.
Final Disposition Act
David and Darlene argued that they had the rights to dispose of Orville’s body because they were considered next of kin under the Final Disposition Act. However, the appellate felt it necessary to address which act ranks ahead of the other in a conflict–RUAGA or Final Disposition Act. RUAGA, as stated earlier, always finds the donors wishes superior to those involved, including next of kin. Because of this, Mansfield simply stated that “the rights of Alcor as a donee of an anatomical gift under RUAGA are superior to David and Darlene’s dispositional rights conferred by the Final Disposition Act.”
This led the court to consider what should be done now since the agreement between Alcor and Orville qualifies as an anatomical gift and Alcor should of have the rights to Orville’s body after death. In Iowa, disinterment may be granted for two reasons: a state issued permit or a court order. Alcor wanted David and Darlene to request a disinterment permit from the court, but permits are only allowed for autopsy or reburial purposes. Does Alcor’s wishes for disinterment meet either of these? Alcor argued that the removal of Orville’s head and cremation of the rest of his body should be considered a reburial. The appellate court agreed with Alcor under Iowa legislature that this would be considered reburial with an importance purpose.
Rights to Dig?
Finally, the appellate court decided whether or not an issue of mandatory injunction should be placed on David and Darlene. The mandatory injunction here would be requiring David and Darlene to order a disinterment of Orville’s body.
The appellate court made their decisions with high regard to Orville’s wishes of cryonic suspension. They even went on to say that if their had been no RUAGA, and the appeal was just focused on the Final Disposition Act, Orville’s signed wises with Alcor would have taken precedent. Mansfield wrote, “We believe equity lies with the party that intends to carry out Orville’s wishes.” With the courts decision, David and Darlene argued two points. First, they suggested that all Alcor wanted was to keep the membership fee and that the disinterment of Orville’s body would now be pointless with the decomposition that has happened. The court rejected these arguments. The rejection was made because as co-conservators, David and Darlene should have felt the need to look over Orville’s wishes before death, especially knowing that Orville wanted to undergo some sort of cryosuspension. Mansfield added this, “In short, from the record before us, we conclude that David and Darlene decided to bury Orville despite knowledge he had made different arrangements for his remains.”
The Conclusion
With deciding that David and Darlene knew about Orville’s wishes with Alcor and ignored them, the appeal was soon concluded. Mansfield wrote, “we conclude that Alcor was entitled to its requested mandatory injunction directing David and Darlene to execute the application for a disinterment permit, with Alcor bearing all the burden and expense of disinterment.” In conclusion, the appellate court sent back their opinions to the district court for further proceedings and a potential disinterment execution.
Next Time
So, what has the public learned from this? First of all, make sure you know the wishes of your loved ones before they pass away. Secondly, realize that even if you disagree with them, chances are the court will always side with the wishes of a donor under RUAGA. Disinterment with the purpose of neurosuspension is not as unorthodox as you may have expected before this.
Journalism & Law 